The making of decisions by committees and similar groups has the apparent advantage that the odd beliefs of individual members may become modulated in the process of reaching a consensus, so that the final decision is more conformable to "justice", or at least to its appearance, than what might be the wild decision of an individual. This is what gives value to corporate decisions; and on balance, it may compensate for the risk of corporate indecision, which is not unknown. But is indecision the only danger in the process of decision-making by committee? I believe not; and in this paper I draw attention to another danger, which I have ventured to call "corporate tyranny", to distinguish it from the more frequent tyrannies perpetrated by individuals.
I believe that, exceptionally perhaps, committees may make decisions leading to actions from which each of the individual members, acting as an individual, might shrink. This may come about in various ways. Should one or more members express abhorrence, with a request that "an example be made", it is difficult for what may be the tolerant, or balanced, majority to match the clarity and cogency of the clairvoyant fanatic. Should the majority grow weary, they may, however unworthily, settle for peace, and the comfortable anonymity of "a committee decision". Again, something may be converted into a moral issue, or even "a matter of principle", when it is really a matter of aesthetics, of custom, or of current legal provision. In At first sight, these two cases are very different. One is a prohibition, with serious practical consequences; the other may be regarded as a reprimand, with little practical effect. However, what they have in common seems to me more significant than their superficial differences. They are both exercises of authority by a duly constituted body, entirely correct in their formal process, but with an outcome in the first case only saved from being ridiculous by the gravity of its effect, in the second not even so redeemed. They both involve important ethical principles, informed consent in the first case, confidentiality in the second. But neither of these is a principle which admits of no exceptions: a rigorous interpretation of informed consent would preclude any study, other than observational, of a great deal of mental disease, and of disease in infancy and early childhood; and confidentiality is regularly, and properly, breached in the prevention and detection of serious crime, and (perhaps less properly) within the NHS in the pursuit of what are delicately if imprecisely described as "essential management functions". I suggest that in both my examples the protection of a principle, generally agreed and under no particular threat, has been given too much weight, to the obvious detriment of particular individuals. It is not enough to ask of a decision, "Is it legal?" One should further ask, "Is it sensible?"; and, "Is it humane?" My consideration of these matters does not yield anything so definite as a conclusion; but it makes me venture a suggestion to the considerable number of people who serve on committees, tribunals and the like. Like the rest of us, in regulating their own conduct as individuals, they should be guided by whatever ethical insights flow from their nature, upbringing and experience, enjoying the freedoms and trials of deontology; but when they are acting as members of a corporate body, they have an additional duty to be deliberately utilitarian, the prime utility being that of the individual whom they are considering. I am not so foolish as to deny the existence and importance of "society"; but alarm bells should ring when societal considerations, not necessarily clear-cut, are made the basis of decisions which harm individuals. It may not be necessary to go as far as William Blake in the view that "General Good is the plea of the scoundrel, hypocrite, and flatterer"; but to look at particular issues with a perspective limited to abstract principle can damage the "Minute Particulars" which give effect to benevolence.
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